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Abstract 
Reforms to spectrum management methods have been underway for two decades in several OECD 
countries. Their aim is to improve the efficiency with which the spectrum is allocated and used 
through higher reliance on market forces (market pricing, property rights, trading). These reforms have 
made spectrum-intensive industries more allocatively efficient through improved spectrum valuation 
and higher investor certainty about long-term spectrum holdings. However, the high degree of 
resource exclusivity conferred by property rights potentially crowds out access by innovative services, 
affecting dynamic efficiency and reforms may also undermine technical efficiency if the owner makes 
scant use of the privatised spectrum. The paper takes stock of action research performed in the 
regulatory agency of a reforming country to present the trade-offs involved, and suggest a piecemeal 
approach to reforms based on a flexible licensing system.  
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Introduction 
How efficiently we allocate and licence the radio spectrum to different radio communications 
services and users is critical to the competitiveness of the information industry and the many 
beneficiaries of its services.  Accordingly, several OECD countries have adopted principles of 
efficient spectrum management
1
. These principles have been used to guide reforms to 
spectrum management methods through use of market pricing and assignment of property 
rights.  
Efficiency objectives are a direct response to the economic failings of control and command 
arrangements that prevailed prior to reforms, when regulatory agencies allocated radio 
spectrum to wireless services with little or no regard for market forces. The opportunity cost 
of using control and command arrangements to allocate spectrum frequencies had been 
criticised by several generations of economists starting with seminal pieces by (Coase (1959); 
De Vany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara and Scott (1969); Herzel (1951); Levin (1966 )), and the 
deregulatory reforms undertaken from the late 1980s onward were primarily motivated by 
efficiency gains.  
However, the new spectrum laws and regulations are generally unclear about the precise 
nature of the efficiency gains to achieve. The main policy reform of the last two decades was 
the introduction of spectrum property rights and the assignment of these rights through 
auction and other market-based pricing mechanisms. These reforms improved the allocative 
efficiency of spectrum-intensive industries through higher investment certainty and improved 
spectrum valuation. However, the high exclusivity of property rights potentially crowds out 
access by innovative services on a secondary user basis, affecting dynamic efficiency and, 
potentially, affecting technical efficiency if the owner also leaves the spectrum fallow. 
Thus, efficiency principles can be a confusing source of guidance for regulatory agencies. 
Frequency bands differ in physical properties and radio communications services differ in 
their commercial value and in their contribution to the public interest. The relative importance 
of technical or dynamic efficiency for the public interest varies with these characteristics. A 
one size fits all approach to reform may only intensify conflicts between efficiency objectives.  
The article builds a case for a more tailored, piecemeal approach to reforming spectrum 
management methods. Maximising the public interest based on the constrained maximisation 
of a menu of efficiency criteria is better served by developing the institutional flexibility to 
craft and select appropriate licensing instruments tailored to achieve selected economic 
objective for specific bands and services. Few amongst reform countries have developed that 
capacity, yet increasing the flexibility of spectrum licensing systems is critical at a time of 
fast-growing spectrum demands for combined voice-data applications. The paper takes stock 
of action research in the regulatory agency of a reforming country to illustrate these points. 
 
Market pricing and property rights 
How far have we really come with economic reforms? With respect to market-based pricing 
reforms have made significant progress over the last 20 years. Most OECD countries now use 
market pricing instruments to allocate spectrum to services, which generate high market value 
                                                 
1
 In the US, where the Communications Act 1934 gives the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the 
power to make regulations, efficiency principles and objectives were adopted through the recommendations of 
FCC regulatory papers. In other reform countries, they were legislated (United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand).  
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- such as cellular and broadband networks. Auction pricing and beauty contests
2
 have 
generally proved the preferred method in reform agencies to initially assign spectrum to these 
services , whereas opportunity cost pricing is increasingly used for licence renewal (Doyle 
2010). Spectrum trading (trading licences in ‘second hand’ markets) has also made significant 
headway in the United States, and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom, Australia and a 
few other reform countries (Xavier and Ypsilanti 2006, ACMA 2008, Crocioni 2009, Akalu 
2010).  
By contrast, the second stage of these reforms, the endowment of spectrum property rights
3
, 
has seen little development outside a small subset of reform-minded countries, among which, 
Australia, El Salvador, Guatemala, New Zealand, the UK and the US. But even in these 
countries, the initial drive for a large scale move towards a system of property rights has 
slowed or stalled over time.  For instance, there have been no new allocations of spectrum 
licences in Australia or management rights in New Zealand over the last decade (Freyens 
2009). The British regulator’s (OFCOM) recent experiment with spectrum usage rights 
(SURs) proved short lived (Webb 2008). In the US, the FCC stopped short of tying property 
rights to the recently auctioned 700 MHz licences , despite their high degree of exclusivity.  
This trend towards a pause in the pace and scope of reforms motivated several agencies and 
policy analysts to set increased targets for the roll-out of spectrum allocations through 
property rights. For instance, in 2002, Kwerel and Williams suggested that the US’ Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) move rapidly towards a system of property rights and 
spectrum trading (Kwerel and Williams (2002 )). Shortly thereafter, Australia’s Productivity 
Commission released its Inquiry Report on Radiocommunications Policy, strongly 
recommending that the Australian Government adopt a wide-scale privatisation approach to 
spectrum allocation (Productivity Commission (2002 )).  Then, the British regulator, 
OFCOM,  concluded its Spectrum Framework Review (SFR) with a well-publicised decision 
to use  market forces (market pricing, service neutrality and trading) to manage over 70% of 
the United Kingdom’s spectrum holdings by 2010 (OFCOM (2005 )). Finally, 27 high-profile 
US economists endorsed reformist positions in a statement recommending the privatisation of 
the radio spectrum to meet future US need is broadband policy (AEI 2006). 
These calls did not lead to further property right allocations in the countries concerned and the 
current regulatory trend is, instead, toward a status quo in the number of property rights 
licences, and in some areas, towards a decline in the exclusivity of these property rights. To 
understand the rationale driving this new policy turn, one needs to understand the economic 
objectives initially set for reforms, particularly the need to improve efficiency in the use and 
allocation of the radio spectrum. 
 
Spectrum efficiency  
Cave et al. (2007, Ch. 11) argue that efficiency in the context of radiocommunications policy 
should be defined based on the Pareto criteria – i.e. in terms of not being able to improve the 
                                                 
2
 In a beauty contest, applicants submit a business plan to the regulatory authority, which ranks and matches 
applications against predetermined public interest criteria – deployment speed, employment etc. - to select a 
licensee, with or without payment of a fee. France, Spain and Sweden used beauty contests to assign 3G licenses 
in the early 2000s (Gans et al. 2005). 
3
 Property rights are here defined as (i) rights to a high degree of usage exclusivity - such as long, uninterrupted 
leases - and (ii) rights to operate with service and/or technology neutrality – such as the right to change the type 
of service or technology used on a specific frequency without being required to obtain regulatory consent. 
Exclusivity and neutrality both greatly improve the degree of certainty to users considering investments in 
spectrum-reliant infrastructure. Property rights therefore increase the market value of the spectrum. 
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well-being of one economic agent without harming that of another. They decompose 
economic efficiency into productive efficiency (least cost production of a given output), 
allocative efficiency (producing a mix of services such that that no other mix could improve 
the overall well being of an economic agent without harming that of another), and dynamic 
efficiency (managing the spectrum in ways that enable long-term productivity improvements 
such as through innovation and R&D). 
Which of these three sub-objectives should have higher priority?  Cave and his co-authors 
emphasise the potential complementarities of these objectives in an ideal world of perfect 
competition.  For instance, they show how a reallocation of spectrum resources between 
sectors with different marginal benefits from spectrum use can increase both allocative and 
productive efficiency - by freeing other resources, which prices and quantities can then be 
used to value the reallocated spectrum. This discussion sets a benchmark to develop pricing 
mechanisms but the authors are well aware that in practice radiocommunications markets bear 
little resemblance to any ideal, frictionless environment. 
In economic theory, productive efficiency is usually subsumed to the over-arching allocative 
efficiency concept, that is, productive efficiency is one of several conditions to be met in 
order to achieve allocative efficiency, and for that reason this paper will assume that 
productive efficiency is implied by allocative efficiency.  
However, one efficiency concept which is not subservient to allocative efficiency is the less 
commonly used concept of technical efficiency. Technical efficiency is achieved when firms 
produce on their production frontier, i.e. when the maximum output attainable from each 
input level is achieved  (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell and Battese (2005 )). Technical efficiency 
refers to making full productive use of a given stock of resources, whereas allocative 
efficiency is more concerned with least cost production, and consumer valuation of the 
services produced, regardless of whether resources are fully used or not. Legislated objectives 
of spectrum reforms put considerable emphasis on efficient usage and allocation of the 
spectrum, but provide little guidance as to which objective should have precedence when 
objectives of efficiency in usage and in allocation conflict with one another.  
In the subsequent sections, we examine these trade-offs and policy roadblocks through an 
Australian case study, but much of the discussion could extend to cover the issues facing New 
Zealand’s management rights system, or the United States’ regulatory debate over white space 
licensing. 
 
Reforms and conflicting economic objectives 
The major aim of spectrum management reforms is to improve efficiency in use and 
allocation of this key resource. This objective is clearly articulated in the key texts of the 
relevant regulatory jurisdictions in spectrum-liberalising countries.  For instance, in the US, 
the Spectrum Policy Task Force of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has 
repeatedly stated that ‘One of the Commission’s key spectrum management goals has been to 
promote efficient access to and use of the radio spectrum’ (FCC 2002 : 4).  
Is efficient access assumed to be conducive to efficient use? Or are these two unrelated 
objectives expected to contribute separately and independently to an overall efficiency goal? 
To clarify its intentions, the FCC suggested adopting three different definitions of efficiency 
(FCC 2002 : 5-9): (i) spectrum efficiency, a throughput measure; (ii) technical efficiency, 
which qualifies throughput efficiency for the cost of using other resources; (iii) economic 
efficiency, which is the ratio of output value over inputs cost and differs from throughput by 
measuring value rather than quantity. 
4 
Importantly, the FCC emphasises that ‘spectrum and technical efficiency feed into and 
become a component of economic efficiency’. High rates of spectrum and technical efficiency 
may just be too costly to achieve compared to the benefits they create to society as a whole. A 
balance must be found between technical and economic considerations, and the FCC seemed 
to have decided in favour of the latter when it supported an extension of economically 
efficient governance regimes (FCC 2002 : 32-34) such as (1) more exclusive usage rights (e.g. 
allowing subdivision, trading and service neutrality) for services with low transaction costs.  
In the United Kingdom, the Communications Act 2003(the Act 2003) requires that spectrum 
policy should lead to ‘the efficient use in the United Kingdom of the electro-magnetic 
spectrum for wireless telegraphy’ (§152, s.5, HMSO 2003). This act of Parliament does not 
discriminate amongst specific efficiency objectives, but Cave et al. (2007, Ch. 11) suggest 
that ‘efficiency in this context is usually understood to mean economic efficiency’ (p. 169, 
their emphasis) in terms of allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. 
Reforms in Australia started with the enactment of the Radiocommunications Act 1992 
(Henceforth ‘The Act’), which in its Part 1.2, Section3, buttresses the importance of using 
efficient spectrum allocation methods: ‘The object of this Act is to provide for management of 
the radiofrequency spectrum in order to (a) maximise, by ensuring the efficient allocation and 
use of the spectrum, the overall public benefit derived from using the radiofrequency spectrum.  
Objective (a), The Act’s foremost objective, emphasises goals of allocative and technical 
efficiency. However, The Act does not stipulate which of ‘allocative efficiency’ and ‘usage -
i.e. technical - efficiency’ should prevail in situations where these two objectives are mutually 
exclusive. Neither does The Act suggest how these objectives should be interpreted and how 
they could be pursued. This ambiguity is of particular importance for assessing the economic 
success (or otherwise) of the main reform brought about by The Act: the introduction of a 
spectrum property rights regime through spectrum licences. 
 
Property rights in Australia 
Under The Act, Australia assigns and regulates the radio frequency spectrum using three 
licensing regimes; apparatus, spectrum and class licences, which are broadly representative of 
command and control, property rights and open access approaches respectively.  Except for a 
few amendments to The Act in 1995 and 1997, which modernised apparatus licences 
(authorising licence transfer, third party operations and spectrum reallocation processes and 
other policy novelties), the three basic licensing regimes have seen little change over the 
years. The last significant alteration was a multi-year consolidation process among class 
licences started in 2000 and completed in 2008. Table 1 summarises the main characteristics 
and attributes of Australia’s trichotomic licensing regime (a similar table could be designed 
with relatively minor alterations for New Zealand’s trichotomic licensing system and with 
larger changes for the US and the UK). 
The Act sets up a legislative regime where spectrum licenses are regulated as property 
(leasehold rather than freehold) for the purpose of subsection 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act (the Constitution).  Consequently, the duty of managing 
interferences is transferred to the licensee. The spectrum owner is entitled to clear 
transmissions but conflicts over interfering transmissions have to be resolved through the 
judicial system rather than through regulatory agencies. 
Spectrum licences (the property rights regime) offer a more appropriate approach to the 
development of spectrum markets than other licensing regimes, such as apparatus licences, 
5 
due to higher certainty (tenure and term), exclusivity, sub-dividability and above all, 
discretion with respect to service and technology selection (service neutrality). To users 
considering long term investment planning decisions, property rights confer a much higher 
degree of certainty and control over the licensed spectrum. 
 
Table 1. Main attributes of Australia’s trichotomic licensing system 
Attributes Apparatus licences Spectrum licences Class licences 
Regime focus Device-centric Space-centric Tech-centric 
Efficiency objective Technical Allocative Dynamic 
Exclusivity Medium to high Very high None 
Coordination rules Administratively set Proprietary Self-governed 
Flexibility (tech-service) None to moderate High variable 
Individually assigned Yes or No Yes No 
Assignment by: Adm. pricing, auction Auction Not assigned 
Price fee / market price Market pricing Free 
Tenure and term 5 years/renewable 15 years / +? Unlimited 
Interference protection provided provided not provided 
Tradability Moderate High Not relevant 
Sub-division Not allowed Allowed Not relevant 
Coordination needed Low High Low 
Service neutrality Usually none High variable 
 
Yet, spectrum licences have proved a somewhat rigid instrument for the Australian regulatory 
agency (the Australian Communications and Media Authority - ACMA). The regulator kept 
much discretion and flexibility in the design of the apparatus and class licences regimes, but 
kept none for the spectrum licence regime, which appears monolithic relative to the other two 
licensing regimes.  Indeed, since the 1992 reforms (and subsequent amendments) the ACMA 
has made full use of its discretion to experiment with both rigid and flexible spectrum 
licensing arrangements.  Hybrid licences of all types have flourished within the control and 
command and open access approaches, but not so within the property rights approach - where 
the regulatory discretion to craft dynamically efficient sub-regimes is in practice transferred to 
the licensee.  Other types of property rights regimes could potentially have been crafted to 
expand the available set of licensing instruments but the discretion to design them is no longer 
a regulatory matter (Freyens (2009 )).  
Hence, some of the legal rules embedded in the trichotomic
4
 licensing structure of the 1992 
reforms have helped deploy a wider array of licensing instruments to fine-tune the needs of 
users and better respond to the opportunities of new technologies. But at the same time, other 
legal rules stemming from the same set of legal reforms feed a pool of ‘licensing gaps’ that 
detract from the public interest they are meant to serve. That is, these rules prevent the 
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 ‘Trichotomy’ refers to the division into three parts, classes, categories, etc. 
6 
deployment of efficiency-enhancing regimes.  Before analysing to what extent legal rules 
reduce potential efficiency in spectrum allocation, one need to understand the different types 
of economic efficiency concepts involved and how radiocommunications law discriminates 
amongst them. 
 
Limitations of the property rights regime 
Allocative efficiency refers to the optimal distribution of scarce economic resources, usually 
through a price mechanism (such as auctions) and supplier discretion in responding to market 
demand (e.g. by defining property rights over the resource).  Technical efficiency refers to 
maximising input-output ratios on the outer edge of a production possibility set. Dynamic 
efficiency
5
 trades off short-run efficiencies for lifecycle efficiency (e.g. as in R&D projects).   
Does the assignment of auctioned property rights to spectrum users help to achieve these three 
efficiency objectives? An effective regime of property rights consists essentially of three 
elements; (i) assignment through market pricing mechanism (e.g. auctions), (ii) user/owner 
discretion with respect to service deployment and/or technology adoption (service- and 
technological neutrality) and (iii) high exclusivity in usage (regulators cannot claw back rights 
in the short to medium term). Whereas each of these three characteristics contributes in its 
own way to efficient spectrum valuation and exchange through ‘invisible hand’ mechanisms, 
which generally serve allocative efficiency, they each also present potential drawbacks in 
terms of specific legislated efficiency objectives
6
.  
 1. Auctions 
The process of pursuing allocative efficiency through spectrum auctions has seen further 
controversies as there have been many instances where spectrum auctions did not deliver 
public interest outcomes. The claim that regulatory authorities achieve allocative efficiency 
through auctions rests on very strong assumptions that are too often unrealistic. Auctions 
provide favourable ground for improvements in allocative efficiency with respect to a 
government-assigned licensing system, because they elicit key valuation information about 
the communication markets served by market providers.  Yet, these spectrum values may also 
reflect the presence of economic rents due to barriers to entry
7
 in many mobile applications 
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 Note that in spectrum policy, dynamic efficiency has tended to adopt another interpretation in which devices 
are dynamically efficient if they can detect idle spectrum opportunities and occupy the vacant space on a 
transitory basis (as in Dynamic Spectrum Access or DSA).  Dynamic efficiency in that sense is similar to the 
FCC’s concept of technical efficiency (maximising input usage at least cost) – FCC (2002). 
6
 Use of property rights to license radiocommunication services has been criticised by Benkler, Yochai, 2003, 
Some economics of wireless communications, in L.F. Cranor, and S.S Wildman, eds.: Rethinking rights and 
regulations: Institutional responses to new communication technologies (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), Reed, 
David P. , 2001, Why spectrum is not property - the case for an entirely new regime of wireless communications 
policy, 27 February 2001, Draft paper, Snider, J. H., 2006, Spectrum policy wonderland: A critique of 
conventional property rights and commons theory in a world of low power wireless devices,  (30 September 
2006, George Mason University, Arlington, VA), Werbach, Kevin, 2004, Supercommons: Towards a unified 
theory of wireless communications, Texas Law Review 82, 863-973., among others. See also reviews in Freyens, 
Benoit Pierre, 2009, A policy spectrum for spectrum economics, Information Economics and Policy 21, 128-44, 
Freyens, Benoit Pierre, 2010, Shared or exclusive radio waves? A dilemma gone astray, Telematics and 
Informatics 27, 293-304.. 
7
 For instance, at the time of 3G auctions in the UK in March 2000, incumbents’ sunk infrastructure costs - the 
pre-existing 2G networks, existing brands and customer basis acted as a deterrent for new entrants (Binmore and 
Klemperer 2002). 
7 
markets and the externalities arising from future collusive behaviour among spectrum users in 
oligopolistic markets. 
A simple example will illustrate this point
8
. Suppose that the status-quo consist of a single 
incumbent operator (e.g. a broadcaster, or a network carrier) who owns a licence for a specific 
amount of scarce spectrum, operating the band as a monopoly and deriving monopoly rents 
from scarcity and exclusivity. Policy makers consider introducing competitive forces through 
reduction of the incumbent’s spectrum endowments and auction of another licence granting 
usage rights to the same frequencies.  
Suppose there are two bidders registered for the auction but neither of them is the incumbent 
(to rule out any return to the status-quo). One bidder is a very effective competitor, e.g. a 
start-up, whose main objective is effective entry and carving market share. The start-up bidder 
would be expected to drive profits significantly lower in that market, but would also expand 
the scope of market transactions, thus increasing consumer and social welfare.  The other 
bidder is a relatively ineffective competitor, e.g. a niche player, whose main objective is to 
generate significant profits. The niche player has an interest in preserving the profitability of 
the industry and would therefore not be expected to restrict or put much pressure on the 
pricing / output behaviour of the incumbent.  
Who will win this auction? In a traditional ascending bid auction, the uncompetitive player is 
the likely winner because the presence of rents in the duopoly characterised by uncompetitive 
behaviour generates positive externalities for the less effective bidder. Given their distinct 
objectives, the start-up is a weaker bidder than the niche player. The future rents from 
collusive or other behaviour compatible with the status-quo enable the uncompetitive player 
to bid at higher levels than the competitive player.  From the consumer’s perspective, one 
would want the effective player to win the auction but the presence of externalities strongly 
reduces the likelihood of this outcome - and there are many such externalities in spectrum 
auctions.  
Optimal auction design can, in theory, deal with these externalities. Sealed-bid auctions 
favour entry by smaller, competitive players
9
 but to be effective the efficiency gains from 
effective competition must outweigh the welfare losses from smaller players lower valuations. 
To the extent that the start-up’s lower willingness to pay is due to barriers to entry, the 
presence of regulations enabling third party access to established incumbent infrastructure can 
help remedy the problem. If the start-up’s weak bids are due to a lack of scale, or the risks 
introduced by market fragmentation then sealed bids may not be optimal. Mixing sealed bid 
and ascending auctions
10
 but the failure of so many 3G auctions to attract new entrants to 
cellular markets do demonstrate the complexity of the task. Hence auctions do not always 
allocate the radio spectrum to its most efficient user, nor do they necessarily lead to socially 
optimal industrial organisation, harming rather than serving allocative efficiency. 
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 This illustration was raised and discussed in a presentation made at the first conference of the Network for 
Economic Research on Electronic Communications NEREC in September 2009. Other inefficiencies from 
poorly designed auctions are discussed in Klemperer (2002, 2003), and Gans, Joshua S., Stephen P. King, and 
Julian Wright, 2005, Wireless communications, in Sumit K. Majumdar, Ingo Vogelsang, and Martin Cave, eds.: 
Handbook of telecommunications economics ii (North-Holland, Amsterdam).. 
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 In the UK’s 3G auction, the regulator designed a two-staged mixed auction mechanism, with a larger number 
of licenses than the number of incumbents (Binmore and Klemperer 2002). Attempts to emulate the British 
scheme led to several fiascos in Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands due to various sources of design or 
regulatory failure (Klemperer 2002). 
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 2. Exclusivity and certainty 
Spectrum licences offer the highest degree of exclusivity in usage in Australia. As opposed to 
other types of licences, which are typically allocated to a service and assigned to an operator 
for a few years, spectrum licences grant property rights over 15 years, offering a high degree 
of certainty to their owners. This high degree of certainty favours allocative efficiency by 
reducing the risk of investing in new infrastructure or in the development of new technologies 
that are specific to a particular range of frequencies. However, owners may make scant usage 
of their private spectrum, for reasons ranging from ‘wait and see’ speculation (when there are 
expectations the value of the spectrum will increase in the short-run) to ‘leapfrogging’ 
(waiting for the next more efficient technology to be available before investing). Speculation 
can be allocatively efficient when owners make well-informed choices about the best return 
for their shareholders and consumption benefits for their customers.  
However, idle spectrum is problematic because the radio spectrum is a resource in high 
demand from diverse sectors of the economy, and property rights spectrum consists of some 
of the most valuable frequencies. If the spectrum is not used by the primary user, ideally, 
there should be regulatory instrument allowing other users to make a productive usage of it on 
a secondary basis. This is essentially the way other licensing regimes operate, but under a 
regime of property rights the degree of exclusivity is such that no other user can access the 
frequencies without explicit consent by the primary user. Hence, the property rights regime 
can generally be presumed to be efficient but only in an allocative sense, not necessarily in a 
technical (maximal usage) sense, because high exclusivity may in some cases prevent full use 
of the resource, so that the local economy (the spectrum space) is not operating on but rather 
below its production frontier. 
Freyens and Yerokhin (2011) for instance illustrate this situation with an example of spectrum 
licences, which remained unused by their owner for years. The unused spectrum was a source 
of unease for the Australian regulatory agency, which received daily complaints from smaller 
prospective users keen to use the spectrum as secondary users but unauthorised to do so. 
Objective (a) of The Act clearly requires an efficient use of the spectrum and this was not the 
case. Should technical efficiency take precedence over allocative efficiency? A possible 
consensus could have been to target allocative efficiency for larger standardized services, and 
productive efficiency for tailored specialist services. However, in a model of investment in 
technological projects with uncertainty and risk aversion, Freyens and Yerokhin show that 
adopting this criterion can still lead to a stalemate between the two objectives. Should the 
regulator force the owner to use the spectrum or relinquish it through so-called use-it-or-lose-
it approaches? This solution would in practice severely reduce the justification for using 
property rights in the first place. Another alternative is to encourage the development of 
secondary market for spectrum trading, so that owners who keep their spectrum idle 
temporarily have incentives to let secondary users use their resource against a payment 
(Freyens and Yerokhin (2011 )). 
 3. Service neutrality 
A third and final issue with property rights is the difficulty to deliver service neutrality in 
practice. Australia defines the service neutrality of its property rights regime through a block 
edge mask (BEM) model, which rests on the specification of the technical framework.  
Spectrum licences are ‘service-neutral’ and ‘space-centric’, i.e. they permit users to operate 
any radiocommunications devices in a given ‘spectrum space’ subject to respecting the 
9 
requirements of a technical framework
11
.  The degree of service neutrality of the licence 
varies along a continuum depending on the exact formulation of the technical framework; too 
much service neutrality weakens the technical framework and may lead to inefficient uses – 
i.e. there is a fundamental trade-off between flexibility and efficiency, but mostly it will be 
difficult if not impossible for a spectrum licensee to vary the type of service deployed on her 
spectrum space without regulatory intervention – required to modify the parameters of the 
block edge mask. Hence the degree of allocative efficiency achieved by the property rights 
regime is restricted by technical and regulatory barriers to potential spectrum reallocation by 
the owner in response to market changes. By contrast the UK’s power flux density approach 
to spectrum property rights (pfd) does not require a fully-specified technical framework. 
Instead, the property rights are defined in terms of interference allowed, and owners are free 
to use the licences to provide any service as long as they comply with the way their rights 
have been defined. However, the pfd approach is still experimental and very few licences 
have been issued (Webb (2009 )). 
 
Conflicting objectives 
The property rights regime was crafted to foster market exchange and to provide certainty to 
operators investing a significant amount of resources in infrastructure of technology 
development. Yet, whilst this licensing regime would generally be expected to lead to higher 
allocative efficiency, that will not always be the case. In particular, technical efficiency may 
be adversely affected by the high degree of exclusivity of the licences. Conversely, licensing 
arrangements that make intensive (productive) use of a specific frequency band will usually 
not be allocatively efficient if the deployed service or the adopted technology are prescribed 
with no regard for market forces (as with most types of administrative licensing). 
Yet, it would be mistaken to assume that these orthogonal choices result from a failure of The 
Act to provide a clear sense of direction. Much of the legislation in this area is influenced (to 
a degree) by regulatory authorities and if the legal texts have remained imprecise over the 
overarching concept of ‘efficiency’, it indicates policy makers’ intent to leave some 
interpretation discretion to implementation agencies. There is no obvious way to resolve these 
trade-offs between different efficiency objectives, and the task of designing efficiency-
enhancing  radiocommunications licences depends largely on the judgements and experience 
of regulatory agencies.  A band designated by ITU regulations for mid-range power, narrow 
channel services used by a high number of users will require a different interpretation of 
‘spectrum efficiency’ than one characterised by a few large operators, transmitting at very 
high power, with nation-wide coverage and important infrastructure investments to protect.  
Hence, the degree of discretion granted to regulatory bodies in recognising the adequate 
nature of efficiency objectives and in designing appropriately matching licensing regimes 
effectively contributes to the pursuit of the public interest (if we agree that efficiency is a 
critical component of the public interest).  One would then hope that these decisions are 
relatively unfettered by political interference, legislative vetoes and other institutional 
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 A spectrum space comes with an underlying population density, incumbent or prospective services and is 
specified through the development of a technical framework.  Only fully specified spectrum spaces are 
marketable to private or public operators.  This approach defines spectrum space over big areas and large 
bandwidths, and is therefore much more compatible with a higher degree of freedom in usage. It is generally 
preferred by large operators seeking the deployment of large-scale networks within the boundaries defined by the 
licence’s technical framework. 
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restraints
12
. If a regulatory authority recognises the need to adopt an allocative efficiency 
approach for a highly valued service requiring considerable capital expenditure, the public 
interest is better served if decision makers can freely design a licence based on market 
instruments and a high degree of legal protection for the investments required, rather than be 
constrained to prescriptive command and control or open access approaches. 
Thus, the public interest may be better served by a versatile set of legal instruments designed 
to cater for the specific requirements of all possible services, technologies and markets, or at 
least by providing agencies with the discretion to develop such instruments.  To some extent, 
this is the path that the early reformist nations, New Zealand and Australia, followed. Due to 
the isolated geographical location of their country (no close neighbouring countries), New 
Zealand’s Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and Australia’s ACMA benefitted 
from significant flexibility with respect to license design relative to other reformers, yet 
achieving a high degree of licensing flexibility was never an overt objective of legislative acts 
in these countries (the Radio communications Act 1989 in New Zealand, and The Act in 
Australia). 
 
Flexibility and efficiency 
Achieving efficiency through licensing flexibility would require having the right licensing 
instrument available to cater for the specific requirements of all possible services, 
technologies and markets, or at least having developed the discretion to design such 
instruments.  The efficiency gains from developing this approach would result from 
expanding the set of institutional constraints that restrict efficient licensing policy.  In other 
words, licensing flexibility is concerned with correcting for the degree of efficiency lost by 
not being able or allowed to design a management regime best fitting the circumstances of an 
industry or a new technology. Licensing flexibility as a measure of the regulatory flexibility to 
respond to different needs with different regulatory instruments is not a mainstream term in 
spectrum parlance, but it has been alluded to by several authors. (Burns (2002 )) for instance 
suggests that we should view efficiency as a broader governance concept: 
‘optimal use of the spectrum requires the needs of users of spectrum to be met in 
the most efficient and effective manner taking account of the economic, functional 
and technical constraints that apply to different services. Assessing how well this 
is achieved in practice requires a large degree of qualitative judgement as well as 
quantitative measurement – hence measuring efficiency is an art as much as a 
science’. 
Subsequently, (Webb (2008 )) observed that: 
‘The SFR [Ofcom’s 2005 Spectrum Framework review] then clearly established 
that only the regulator could decide on the right balance between these three 
different mechanisms [note: command and control, market forces, and unlicensed 
approaches]. For example there appears to be no means other than by regulatory 
decision that spectrum could transition from market forces to licence-exempt.  In 
principle, a user group could try to acquire spectrum from a licence holder and 
turn it into a ‘private commons’ but in practice this appears far too complex to 
occur’. 
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US where senior FCC appointments are political (Webb 2009b). By contrast, Australia’s ACMA and the UK’s 
OFCOM are statutory agency, so technically independent from government. 
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On the other hand, any discretion to craft new management regimes through flexible licensing 
is costly in administrative terms. As in any production process, diversifying supply may erode 
economies of scale, make automation more difficult and increase management cost. In 
Australia, and in the UK, cellular operators with licenses in the 900MHz and 1800MHz Bands 
are still only able to use this spectrum for 2G GSM systems (the licences are of apparatus 
type, rather than property rights). Since these users are few, changing licensing conditions on 
these bands (from an apparatus to a spectrum type of licence) may affect the level playing 
field among competitors
13
. Webb (2009b) notes that this example illustrates just how much 
easier it is to devise a new spectrum strategy than to implement it. The benefits of using a 
flexible licensing system would need to be large enough to compensate for the costs of 
introducing such a system.  
 
Mappings between licensing and regulatory regimes in Australia 
How is Australia performing in terms of new, flexible licensing approaches? Yet, there are 
many more ways to manage spectrum allocation and coordinate interference control. For 
instance, several informal hybrid regimes have seen some degree of deployment in Australia. 
Australia’s trichotomic licensing structure does not fully reflect the actual mix of practical 
approaches unfolding on the ground.  These practical experiments with hybrid spectrum 
management regimes are only authorised under The Act through legal provisions allowing the 
ACMA a significant degree of discretion in designing apparatus licences, and to some extent 
in crafting class and spectrum licences.  
Are regulatory spectrum management regimes really restricted to three options: command and 
control, property rights and open access? There is, conceptually, a much wider array of 
spectrum management approaches available to policy makers (Freyens (2007); Freyens 
(2009 )).  There have been earlier attempts by ACMA to suggest legal reforms towards a 
single licensing regime under The Act, which would allow the regulatory agency to tailor its 
licences to the needs of users as new services and technologies emerge.  In practice there are 
at least about 20 different ways to manage spectrum allocation and interferences (and 
potentially many more), and a wider array of approaches contributes to the efficiency and 
public interest objectives of The Act.  In particular, such a discretionary approach 
(occasionally referred to in the paper as ‘the bespoke approach’) would allow ACMA to fine 
tune the flexibility-certainty dilemma present in its current licensing regimes
14
.  
The bespoke approach was never seriously considered beyond ACMA’s policy branches, but 
Australia’s practical approaches on the ground reveal that some of these conceptual 
approaches have been used in Australia for some time.  However Australia’s trichotomic 
licensing structure does not reflect these developments on the ground.  Australia’s practical 
experiments with hybrid spectrum management regimes are only authorised under The Act 
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Benoit Pierre, 2012, Licensing options for digital dividend spectrum, in G. Faulhaber, G. Madden, and J.   
Petchey, eds.: Regulation and the economic performance of communication and information networks (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham ).. 
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through legal provisions allowing ACMA a significant degree of discretion in designing 
apparatus licences
15
. 
There is a small subset of apparatus licences, which is fully specified in The Act, such as 
licences for national broadcast, temporary community broadcasters, and datacasting, but for 
most apparatus licences ACMA is virtually unconstrained in its approaches.  Apparatus 
licences are generally construed to be the archetype of control and command (C&C) 
management and most of them are device-specific and entail very prescriptive technical 
arrangements.  However some apparatus licences are actually quite flexible and decentralised 
command and control approaches have seen some activity in Australia.  Not all apparatus 
licences fit the stereotype of an arch-rigid management regime ruled by government fiat.   
There is also no shortage of demand for regimes providing both rights certainty and some 
degree of service or technological flexibility in Australia and although spectrum licences are 
one way to meet this need, some versions of the apparatus licensing regime have provided 
alternatives in some areas.  For instance, some flexible apparatus licences, such as the PTS 
licences issued in the 900 MHz band, could have realistically been converted to spectrum 
licences long ago, given their high-value use (cellular markets) and underlying technology 
(GSM).  The fact that they were not converted illustrates just how few differences PTS 
licensees must have perceived in practice between spectrum licensing and flexible apparatus 
licensing, in terms of running their core operations. 
Mapping licences to practical management regimes also reveals gaps between theory and 
practice.  Some of these gaps arise from prescriptive provisions in The Act, whilst other gaps 
stem from an economic incentive problem.  The limits of conducting multi-regime policy 
equipped only with a trichotomic licensing structure constrain ACMA in its quest to allocate 
spectrum to its highest value while serving the public interest.  Spectrum licences are too 
exclusive and unaffordable for many users, class licences are too much restricted to low 
power services, and apparatus licences are generally too prescriptive and provide little 
certainty to licensees. These limitations warrant legislative reforms in some areas of licensing 
policy: the degree of exclusivity in property rights may need to be adjusted to increase the 
dynamic efficiency of spectrum-licensed bands, and the degree of certainty in apparatus 
licences needs to be adjusted in some areas to create conditions favourable to long-term 
investment decisions.   
 
Conclusions 
To a large extent, reforms to spectrum management methods in the United States, in the 
United Kingdom, in Australia and in New Zealand have succeeded in introducing market 
forces in a hitherto rigid resource allocation system. But did they achieve their avowed 
economic objectives? Any attempted answer would be highly contextual. Auctions succeeded 
and failed. In some bands property rights allocations led to investment and network 
deployments but in other bands the spectrum simply laid fallow.  Spectrum trading rose in the 
US but less so in other countries. Economists’ repeated calls, ten years ago, to expand the use 
of market forces did not have noticeable effects.   In this article it was suggested that 
addressing goals of spectrum efficiency in usage and in allocation may require more than 
expanding the scope of auctioned property rights allocations. It would require specific 
amendments to existing licensing systems. The trichotomic licensing system in use in most 
reform countries is not ideally suited to address the economic and technological challenges 
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various reasons, it has been much less used to define and authorise new spectrum management regimes. 
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ahead – particularly the exponential demand for wireless communication devices and the need 
for in-band co-existence arrangements between devices of compatible technology. Command 
and control licences are too prescriptive and provide no long-term certainty over spectrum 
holdings. Property rights licences are economically attractive but they are too exclusive to 
encourage any form of co-existence - and by keeping regulatory oversight at a distance they 
also guarantee no actual usage of the resource. Open access arrangements  are better suited to 
device co-existence but too exposed to the interference problem and therefore too restricted to 
short-range low-power applications.  An expanded licensing toolkit could therefore better 
address future and complex issues such as the allocation of the digital dividend, access rights 
for TV White Space devices, and dealing with the supply of broadband services through 
heterogeneous networks . Reform legal rules to allow greater activity rates and secondary 
usage in property rights spectrum spaces, and to increase the level of certainty and flexibility 
for command and control licences offers a promising way to maximise both mainstream 
economic efficiency and deal with future challenges in spectrum policy.  
14 
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